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Abstract
Freeman (1999) proposes a model in which discount window lending and open market operations
have different effects. This is important because in most of the literature, these policies are
indistinguishable. However, Freeman’s argument that the central bank should absorb losses
associated with default to provide risk-sharing stands in stark contrast to the concern that central
banks should limit their exposure to credit risk. We extend Freeman’s model by introducing moral
hazard. With moral hazard, the central bank should avoid absorbing losses and Freeman’s
argument breaks down. However, we show that policies resembling discount window lending and
open market operations can still be distinguished in this new framework. The optimal policy is for
the central bank to make a restricted number of creditors compete for funds. By restricting the
number of agents, the central bank can limit the moral hazard problem. By making them compete
with each other, the central bank can exploit market information that reveals the state of the
economy.
JEL classiﬁcation: G20, E58
Bank classiﬁcation: Payment, clearing, and settlement systems; Financial markets; Central bank
research
Résumé
Freeman (1999) propose un modèle qui permet de différencier les effets des opérations d’open
market de ceux des prêts accordés au guichet de l’escompte. Il s’agit là d’une caractéristique
importante, car la plupart des travaux de la littérature ne dissocient pas ces deux moyens
d’intervention. L’argument de Freeman voulant que les banques centrales absorbent les pertes
attachées aux défaillances pour mutualiser les risques tranche avec le souci de limiter l’exposition
de ces institutions au risque de crédit. Les auteurs enrichissent le modèle de Freeman en y insérant
un aléa moral. Cet élément incite les banques centrales à ne pas éponger les pertes et invalide
l’argument de Freeman. Les auteurs montrent que leur modèle permet encore de distinguer
l’incidence de politiques semblables aux opérations d’open market et à l’octroi de prêts au guichet
de l’escompte. Pour les banques centrales, la politique optimale consiste à soumettre leurs fonds à
la concurrence d’un groupe restreint de créanciers. Cette limitation du nombre des agents permet
aux banques centrales de contenir l’aléa moral. La concurrence créée donne à celles-ci la
possibilité d’exploiter l’information qui ﬁltre des marchés sur l’état de l’économie.
Classiﬁcation JEL : G20, E58
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Systèmes de paiement, de compensation et de règlement; Marchés
ﬁnanciers; Recherches menées par les banques centrales1 Introduction and Motivation
Most central banks have at their disposition two tools to provide liquidity
to depository institutions. Central banks can oﬀer collateralized loans at an
announced interest rate, as does the Federal Reserve with the discount window
and the Bank of Canada with the Bank rate. Central banks can also buy or sell
assets through open market operations. This is typically done by auctioning
securities to a small number of banks, called primary dealers in the U.S. and
Canada.1 The primary dealers in turn distribute the funds to the market.
In most monetary models these two tools are indistinguishable, making it
diﬃcult to discuss or evaluate policy. A notable exception is Freeman (1999).
Freeman shows that policies resembling discount window lending and open mar-
ket operations have diﬀerent implications in terms of risk-sharing. The model
shows that liquidity provision policy by the central bank is beneﬁcial to the
extent that the central bank absorbs losses related to default. This conclusion
stands in stark contrast to most policy discussions concerning liquidity provi-
sion policies that focus on eﬀorts to avoid exposing the central bank to credit
risk.2
In this paper, we extend Freeman’s framework to allow for moral hazard.
We show that the central bank should avoid being exposed to risk because
creditor’s incentives to monitor their loans are reduced when the central bank
is likely to suﬀer losses. However, policies resembling discount window lending
and open market operations can be distinguished in our framework. We ﬁnd
that central banks should let a restricted group of agents compete for central
bank liquidity; as is typically done in open market operations. We also argue
that the discount window may have beneﬁts in particular situations where it
should be widely accessible. This distinction does not arise in Freeman’s work.
1For the rest of the paper we will refer these banks simply as primary dealers
2See for example Coleman (2002) or Madigan and Nelson (2002).
1In our model, the economy can be in a good state, in which case no loans
default, or in a bad state, in which case a fraction of loans default. Creditors
can reduce the probability of default of the loans they make by exerting costly
eﬀort. Other creditors can observe the quality of a loan but the central bank
cannot.3
The central bank can provide incentives for creditors to monitor their loans
if it restricts the set of creditors who can interact with the central bank. The
intuition is that it is costly for creditors to deviate from the optimal level of
eﬀort if they acquire funds from other creditors; who can evaluate the quality
of the loan they hold. The fewer creditors have access to the central bank,
the higher the probability that a deviation will be costly. In turn these costly
deviations cause creditors to increase their monitoring and reduce the eﬀect of
an aggregate default.
The central bank can learn the state of the economy if it makes creditors
compete for funds. The intuition is that if creditors have to compete for funds,
they bid up the price at which they borrow until the expected value of the loan
is exactly equal to the value of the collateral. This is not possible with a policy
that proposes funds at a ﬁxed rate.
A policy resembling open market operations has both desirable features
and allows the central bank to provide liquidity without distorting incentives
to monitor.4 Our model thus suggests that central bank should prefer this
kind of policy. However, we also argue that in some special situations, a policy
of lending funds at a ﬁxed interest rate may be desirable. After the terrorist
3The assumption that the central bank cannot observe loan quality is without loss of
generality. The weaker assumption that the central bank has a less precise signal of loan
quality then the creditors would complicate the math below but deliver the same qualitative
results.
4We should note that the key point we are making is that the central bank allows the
operation of the policy to depend on the information in the market. In the Canadian case
the market sensitive policy is conducted at a ﬁxed price but the implementation of it is based
on market conditions.
2attacks of September 11, destruction of telecommunication equipment made
it impossible for the interbank market to operate properly for a few days, for
example. In such a case, it is desirable for agents to have access to the central
bank directly through the discount window. Another case is where the central
bank must forecast the amount of liquidity needed in the market in this case the
market insensitive acts as cap on the discount rate and helps ensure creditors
against large forecasting mistakes on the part of the central bank.
In this paper we take the decision of an individual to default as exogenous
since we want to focus on the moral hazard problems of monitoring creditors.
However, the size of an aggregate default is endogenous in our model. In a re-
lated paper Mills (2006) examines a model with strategic default of debtors and
looks at the distortions of collateralized central bank lending and discounted
central bank lending. Our work diﬀers from Mills (2006) in that we focus on
creditors as the monitors of debtors and examine how central bank policies give
creditors the right incentives to monitor.
Also in a survey paper Zhou (2000) conjectures on the eﬀect that endogenous
timing of arrivals at the central island would have on the diﬀerent eﬀects the
policy instruments would have in Freeman (1999) model. While the underlying
timing of arrivals to the central island is exogenous in our model the endogenous
monitoring choice makes arrival time eﬀectively endogenous and conﬁrms her
conjecture that the policy prescriptions of Freeman (1999) overturned.
Our paper is based in the payment economics literature that was started by
Freeman and Tabellini (1998) and Freeman (1996). In addition to the previ-
ously mentioned works above examples from this literature are: Green (1999)
who uses this framework to examine public versus private provision of liquidity;
Fujiki (2003) who extends the framework to an international setting; Chapman
(2007) who looks at optimal international policy coordination; and Mills (2004)
who uses a mechanism approach to the examine the key assumptions in this
3class of model.
Our paper is also related to recent work in the Lender of Last Resort (LOLR)
Literature. Speciﬁcally our model has some of the same intuition as Freixas,
Parigi, and Rochet (2004); who ﬁnd that the form that LOLR facilities should
take depends on the what incentive eﬀects a particular policy has on the eﬀort
devoted to loan portfolio monitoring.
The paper is structured as follows. We develop the model with laissez-fair
intervention in section 2. We then examine the equilibrium of this model in
section 4 and ﬁnd the amount of monitoring and the welfare in this equilibrium.
In section 5 we introduce the two types of policy mechanisms we wish to study
and we then ﬁnd the equilibria under these two diﬀerent policy mechanisms
and compare them to the base case of a laissez-fair policy. We sketch some
extensions to the model in section 6 and ﬁnally we conclude in section 7.
2 The model
Our framework is an extension of Freeman (1999)’s model of aggregate credit
risk in a payment system. Consider an economy on an archipelago around a
central island. The chain of islands consists of a large number of island pairs.
Each island pair consists of an island inhabited by a large number of two-period
lived agent we call debtors and an island inhabited by a large number of two-
period lived agent we call creditors. All agents are endowed with a type speciﬁc
good in their ﬁrst period of life.
2.1 Debtors
The debtor’s problem is identical to the problem in Freeman (1999). A debtor
would like to consume when young both their own good as well as that of the
creditor. A generation t debtor values diﬀerent consumption plans according









t is the amount of their own debtor good they consume, cc
t is the amount
of creditor good they consume, θ is the probability of a default shock, (1−et)η
is the probability that a debtor defaults on her loan, and dd
t+1 is the amount
of the debtor good a defaulting debtor consumes when old. The functions
vd(·), vc(·), and vd(·) have strictly positive ﬁrst derivatives and strictly negative
second derivatives.
A debtor’s probability of default depends on the monitoring eﬀort, et, ex-
erted by the debtor’s trading partner. We assume that (1−et)η also denotes the
fraction of debtors that default, if all creditors choose the same eﬀort. Hence
(1 − et)η can be thought of as the size of the default shock. Debtors know the
choice of eﬀort by creditors when they trade.
The budget constraints, and relevant market clearing conditions, are:
pt = ptd
d
t + mt, (2)
mt = ht, (3)
c
d
t = htπt, (4)
pt+1d
d
t+1 = mt. (5)
Let pt denote the dollar price of a good on debtor island at t, or the price level.
Also, mt is the amount of money acquired by a debtor, ht is the nominal value
of the debtor’s debt, and πt is the price in creditor island goods at t of a promise
to pay 1 on the central island at t + 1.
Equation (2) says that a debtor splits his unit endowment between con-
sumption and sale to creditors in exchange for money. Equation (3) states that
5a debtor must have enough money to repay his debt. Equation (4) states that
the amount of creditor good consumed by a debtor is equal to the real value
of his debt. Equation (5) states that a debtor will consume debtor goods when
old if he does not have to repay his debt in the central island.






















































The creditors have the same endowments and utility functions as in Freeman
(1999). They wish to consume their own goods when young and wish to con-
sume debtor goods when old. There exists a probability (1−α) that the creditor
will experience a taste shock and wish to consume early. α is realized at the
beginning of an agent’s second period in life and is private information. The









t is the amount of their own creditor good consumed, dc
t+1 is the amount
of debtor good consumed by the late-leaving creditor and ˜ dc
t+1 is the amount
of debtor good consumed by the early-leaving creditor. The functions uc(·)
and ud(·) are have strictly positive ﬁrst derivatives and strictly negative second
derivatives.
6The budget constraint of young creditors is the same as in Freeman (1999),
1 = c
c
t + ltπt, (9)
where lt is the nominal value at t of a creditor’s loans to debtors, and πt is the
price in creditor island goods at t of a promise to pay $1 on the central island at
t+1. This constraint says that young creditors split their endowment between
consumption and sale to debtors in exchange for an IOU.
2.3 Loan Monitoring
A creditor can invest eﬀort in monitoring the loan he extends to the debtor.
This monitoring helps reduce the idiosyncratic risk involved in the event of a
default. The disutility of eﬀort from monitoring is denoted by Φ(et) where Φ is
an increasing concave function and Φ(0) equals zero. Eﬀort linearly decreases
the idiosyncratic risk involved in a given loan; for example a loan where the
creditor has invested et will default with probability (1 − et)η. All creditors
can verify the amount of monitoring inherent in a loan but the central bank
cannot.
We should note that loan monitoring and the fact that the central bank
does not observe eﬀort are conditional on the structure of the banking system.
Member banks of the payment system are typically very low risk institutions
and the central bank can observe this low risk nature. What the central bank
cannot observe is what risk reducing actions a bank is taking at the margin.
2.4 Goods Trading
The pattern of trade in our model is similar to Freeman (1999). Young debtors
travel to the creditor islands and trade a loan for creditor goods. When they
return to their own island a old creditor arrives and trades outside money for
7some debtor goods. We assume that there is no ﬁnancial market on which young
creditors can trade loans among each other. Creditors have an opportunity to
trade loans in their second period of life.
There exists two risks inherent in the creditor extending payment credit to
the debtor: First, the debtor may default on the loan and, second, the debtor
may not be able to settle the loan until after the creditor has a taste shock
to consume early.5 Given these two shocks and equation (9) we can write a
generation t creditor’s value for choices of monitoring and loans in his ﬁrst
period of life as
uc(1 − πtlt) − Φ(et) + E [V (lt,et)], (10)
where lt is the amount of loans extended, et is the eﬀort put into monitoring the
loans that have been given, and V (lt,et) is the value of loans and monitoring
next period when the creditor is old with the expectation being taken over the
two risks mentioned above.
The value function of loans and monitoring V (lt,et) is the utility that the
creditor receives when old after the shocks he is subject to are realized, and the
expectation is over the probability of being in the given state. Since the return
on the monitored loans depends on the intervention policy of the central bank
the value function will be discussed further below.
3 The Secondary Loan Market
When creditors and debtors are old they must travel to the central island to
settle the payment obligations from the previous period’s transactions. All
creditors arrive at the central island but only a fraction λ of debtors arrive.
Once a debtor arrives his payment debt is settled and the corresponding creditor
5This latter coordination problem has been extensively studied in the payment economics
literature, see for example Martin (2004)
8receives lt in money. Once this ﬁrst round of settlement has taken place an
individual creditor receives two pieces of information: First, whether she has
received a liquidity shock and must consume. Second, whether an aggregate
default shock has occurred. If a default shock occurs, it is not known which
uncleared debt contracts will be defaulted on until the remaining debtors reach
the central island. Hence at the start of a settlement period there are four ex
ante types of creditors depending on whether they received a liquidity shock
and whether the debt they hold cleared. After the shocks have been revealed,
the secondary debt market opens and an individual may trade a portion of his
debt for either some debt from another creditor or for outside money.
3.1 No Default Shock
Let ρt+1 denote the rate of discount, relative to its face value, at which unsettled
debt trades in the secondary market.6 Assume for the moment that a default
shock has not occurred. Early-leaving creditors whose debt has been settled do
not trade in the market. Similarly, late-leaving creditors with unsettled debt
do not trade since they can wait for the full value of their debt. Early-leaving
creditors who have uncleared debt would like to sell their debt in exchange for
money. Late-leaving creditors who have settled their debt can buy this debt
and wait until it gets settled. The per capita amount of debt bought by those
later-leaving creditors is denoted by qt+1
Therefore the supply of money for debt will equal at most the aggregate
amount of money that late-leaving creditors receive from cleared debt; this
equals αλlt. The demand for money in the secondary market equals the ag-
gregate supply of uncleared loans held by early-leaving creditors; this equals
(1 − α)(1 − λ)lt. There is a liquidity constraint when demand is greater then
6We use the terms secondary market and discount market interchangeably.
9the maximum supply; that is when
(1 − α)(1 − λ)lt > αλlt. (11)
When the liquidity constraint is binding, the discount rate decreases below one
to clear the market. Formally,
ρt+1 =
αλ
(1 − α)(1 − λ)
< 1. (12)
Equation (12) comes from the fact that supply (1 − α)(1 − λ)lt of loans in the
discount market must equal face value of uncleared loans demanded (qt+1) and
that the discounted value of loans a creditor buys ρt+1qt+1 is constrained by
the amount of money they bring to the discount market αλlt.
We can summarize the return obtained by creditors as follows:
• A settled early-leaver receives a return of one.
• An unsettled early-leaver receives a return of ρt+1.
• A settled late-leaver receives a return of 1/ρt+1.
• An unsettled late-leaver receives a return of one.
3.2 Default Shock
Now assume that there is a default shock and that all creditors have exerted
the same eﬀort in monitoring. Recall that the size of the shock and the level
of eﬀort is common knowledge to all creditors. We assume the condition that
1−η is greater then λ which makes the early settlement of debt uninformative.
In this case settled early-leavers have a return of one, as before. Unsettled




Since the creditors are risk-averse, they prefer to diversify this risk and receive
a certain return of




Late-leavers can achieve this diversiﬁcation by trading unsettled debt with each
other. As a result, late-leavers hold a riskless diversiﬁed portfolio of unsettled
debt. Late-leaving creditors with settled debt use their money to buy the
unsettled debt of early-leaving creditors. The price at which they buy the debt
is given by equation (12) if the liquidity constraint binds, or by the expected
return of the debt, equation (14) if the liquidity constraint does not bind. Once
late-leaving creditors have bought the early-leaver’s debt they have an incentive
to perfectly diversify their holdings of the debt and therefore receive a certain
return of r(e)/ρt+1.
Therefore in the case of a default shock, and if the liquidity constraint binds,
the returns for the diﬀerent types of creditors are:
• A settled early-leaver receives a return of one.
• A unsettled early-leaver receives a return of ρt+1.
• A settled late-leaver receives a return of r(e).
• A unsettled late-leaver receives a return of
r(e)
ρt+1.
After the discount market is closed, the early-leavers consume debtor goods
on the debtor islands, unsettled debt contracts are either settled or revealed
to have defaulted, and the late-leavers consume debtor goods on the debtor
11islands. Both early and late leavers trade money for debtor goods at the price
pt+1; determined to equate the supply and demand of money.
4 Equilibrium
We deﬁne an equilibrium in the usual manner; agents have rational expectations
and solve their individual decision problems given prices, and prices clear the
various markets given the optimal behavior of the agents. We formalize this in
the following deﬁnition
Deﬁnition 1 (Equilibrium). An equilibrium is deﬁned as a sequence of prices
{ρt,πt,pt}∞






t=0, and a sequence of per period money stocks {M}∞
t=0 such
that markets clear; and both creditors and debtors solve their respective opti-
mization problems.
We will focus on stationary and symmetric equilibria. A stationary sym-
metric equilibrium is deﬁned as an equilibrium where all quantities and prices
are constant for all periods and agents of the same type choose similar actions.
The key equations we want to focus on in an equilibrium are the ﬁrst order




c(1 − πl) = E[V1(l,e)], (15)
Φ
′(e) = E[V2(l,e)], (16)
where Vi is the derivative of the value function with respect to its i the argu-
ment. The RHS of equation (15) is the sum of derivatives of the creditors utility
function for debtor goods weighted by the probability of the state and the re-
turn on the loan in that state, where eﬀort determines what is the expected
12return to a loan.
The choice of eﬀort and loan supply is determined by the intersection of
these two equations in (e,l) space. Since the set of possible equilibrium values
is a closed convex set it follows that at least one equilibrium must exist.
5 Central Bank Intervention
Assume that there exists an inﬁnite-lived agent on the central island which
we will label as the monetary policy authority or central bank. We assume
that the central bank has the ability to costlessly print money and can enforce
all contracts on the central island. The central bank’s objective function is
to implement an allocation where the liquidity constraint in the secondary
loan market is relaxed while avoiding bailing out any creditors through money
injections.7
5.1 The Benchmark Allocation
Since we are interested in the liquidity provision policy of the central bank, we
want to compare the allocation achieved when the liquidity constraint binds
with the allocation obtained when the liquidity constraint does not bind. The
analysis of section 3 implies that if the liquidity constraint does not bind and
there is no default shock, all creditors receive a return of one on their loans.
When the liquidity constraint does not bind and there is a default shock, credi-
tors whose debt are settled early receive a return of one on their loan, regardless
of whether they must consume early or late. Creditors whose debt is not settled
early receive a return of r(et). It follows that
E [V (lt,et)] = (1 − θ)ud (lt) + θλud (lt) + θ(1 − λ)ud (ltr(et)). (17)
7This is optimal in situations where moral hazard is suﬃciently sever.
13The ﬁrst order conditions (15) thus become
u
′
c(1 − πl) = [1 − θ(1 − λ)]u
′
d (lt) + θλr(et)u
′








We denote the quantities associated with this allocation with asterisks.
5.2 Laissez-Fair Equilibrium
In a laissez-fair equilibrium the central bank is inactive and all agents know that
the liquidity constrain will bind. In this case the discount factor is a constant
given by equation (12) and we will denote this constant discount factor by ¯ ρ.
For the discount factor to be binding in all states of the world it is bounded
from above by the case of no eﬀort in monitoring loans,
¯ ρ <
(1 − η)(1 − λ)
η + (1 − η)(1 − λ)
. (20)
In the case when equation (20) is binding then a given unsettled loan will trade
at the discount ¯ rho when traded for money regardless of the amount of eﬀort
that has been devoted to monitoring the loan. We can then write the expected
value of a loan as, this assumes the individual creditor,
E [V (lt,et] = (1 − θ)
(






































14We can use equation (21) to derive the ﬁrst order condition of creditors’



























































. Since this equality holds if and only if ¯ ρ = 1, then it must be
the case that the allocation under laissez faire is diﬀerent from the benchmark
allocation. Indeed, since ¯ ρ < 1, then r(et)lt < r(e∗)l∗ under laissez faire.
5.3 Liquidity Provision by the Central Bank
In this section we consider diﬀerent ways in which the central bank can relax
the liquidity constraint. First, we show that if the central bank can perfectly
enforce the loans it makes, then it can achieve the benchmark allocation by
making loans at an interest rate of zero. The more interesting case is when
the central bank is unable to enforce loans perfectly, as in Freeman (1999). In
this case, we compare a policy of providing liquidity at an interest rate ﬁxed
ex-ante with a policy under which a subset of agents can compete for central
bank reserves.
5.3.1 Perfect Enforcement
If the central bank is able to enforce the ﬁnancial transactions it makes perfectly,
then it can achieve the benchmark allocation by lending at a net interest rate
15of zero. By perfect enforcement, we mean that the central bank is able to make
loans only to late-leavers and can force these late-leavers to repay their debt
before they leave the central island. Hence, with perfect enforcement the central
bank does not need to worry about agents defaulting of their loans, regardless
of the quality of the collateral they oﬀer. By lending enough funds, the central
bank can eliminate the liquidity constraint and, by lending at a net interest
rate of zero, the central bank makes no proﬁts from its lending activity. Since
agents cannot default on their central bank loans, their incentive to exert eﬀort
is the same as under the benchmark allocation. Hence they choose et = e∗ and
lt = l∗.
5.3.2 Market Insensitive Policy
For the remainder of the paper, we assume that the central bank is not able
to perfectly enforce ﬁnancial transaction. With limited enforcement, agent will
default on their debt if the collateral they have pledged is worth less than the
debt. Similarly, agents will renege on repurchase agreements.
We deﬁne a market insensitive policy as one where the central bank sets
a discount rate ρCB prior to the discount market opening. The central bank
can therefore not condition its trades with creditors on any information that
it learns during the discount market. The central bank implements the mar-
ket insensitive lending policy by setting a discount rate ρCB at which it buys
uncleared loans. To show that a market insensitive policy cannot achieve the
benchmark allocation, we again assume that et = e∗ and lt = l∗ and establish a
contradiction. In that case, the central bank would need to set ρCB = 1, when
there is no default shock, and ρCB = 1 −
(1−e∗)η
(1−λ) when there is a default shock.
Since the price must be set ex-ante, the central bank cannot set the correct
price in all cases. If it chooses ρCB = 1 and there is a liquidity shock, all agents
will ask for a central bank loan and default on that loan. If the central bank
16sets ρCB = 1−
(1−e∗)η
(1−λ) and there is no default shock, then the central bank does
not loosen the liquidity constraint completely.
It is also worth noting that if agents have free access to the central bank,
either agents choose no eﬀort or they do not borrow from the central bank.
The value of a diversiﬁed loan portfolio in a default situation and with no
eﬀort involved will be equal to
ρ
no =
(1 − λ)(1 − η)
η + (1 − λ)(1 − η)
. (24)
If ρCB is less then ρno then it follows that no creditor will wish to transact
with the central bank and the market insensitive policy will be inactive. If ρCB
is greater then ρno then creditors with unsettled debt prefer to acquire money
from the central bank rather than from other creditors since the central bank
pays more than the expected return on the debt. Moreover, since the price
oﬀered by the central bank is independent of the eﬀort chosen by creditors, all
creditors prefer to exert no eﬀort.
5.3.3 Market Sensitive Policy
In this section, we consider a diﬀerent liquidity provision policy by the cen-
tral bank. We assume that the central bank chooses a subset of creditors at
random at the beginning of the settlement period. We call the creditors in
that subset “dealers” and let S denote the size of the subset. Only dealers are
allowed to obtain liquidity from the central bank. However, dealers can serve
as intermediaries between other creditors and the central bank.
The subset of creditors who are designated dealers compete against each
other when attempting to obtain liquidity. Assume for a moment that the
equilibrium level of eﬀort is e. In this case the dealers are willing to buy loans
from the non-dealers at a discount equal to ρ(e). They compete against each
17other on terms of price in a Bertrand competition.
The dealers can in turn oﬀer these loans as collateral for loans of liquidity
from the central bank at a rate ρCB which depends on the eﬀort reports of the
dealers. Therefore, banks make a proﬁt per unit of loans equal to
r(e) + [ρ
CB − ρ(e)]. (25)
where r(e) is the return on loans based on the true eﬀort. Since dealers observe
eﬀort they will not want to pay more then ρ(e) for a given loan and since dealers
are competing for loans any oﬀer less then ρ(e) will be bid up to ρ(e) by the
other dealers; at this price each dealer buys an equal share of loans from the
non-dealers.
Too buy these loans they must simultaneously oﬀer them for collateral with
the central bank in a Bertrand price competition where the central bank makes
loans at the highest interest rate (lowest discount rate). We show that the
equilibrium discount rate for these central bank loans is ρ(e); this can be seen
from the per unit proﬁt given in (25). At this equilibrium a given dealer can
deviate by either raising or lowering the discount rate they oﬀer the central
bank. If the deviating dealer raises his bid above ρ(e) then the central bank
will not make any loans too them in preference to the other dealers. If the
deviating dealer lowers his bid below ρ(e) then he will receive all the liquidity
he wants from the central bank but will make losses since the dealer is receiving
an interest rate below that which he pays to the non-dealers.
We show that if the subset of dealers is suﬃciently small, then there exists
and equilibrium such that all creditors provide the level of eﬀort et = e∗. To do
that, we assume that all creditors choose eﬀort et = e∗ and consider a creditor’s
incentive to deviate.
The zero proﬁt condition above implies that dealers will oﬀer to pay an
18interest rate on a loan at the central bank exactly equal to the expected value
of the collateral they oﬀer. Hence, the interest rate on central bank loans will
be ρCB = 1 when there is no default shock and ρCB =
[1−(1−e∗)η](1−λ)
(1−e∗)η+[1−(1−e∗)η](1−λ)
when there is a default shock.
If the deviating agent is chosen to be a dealer, he can borrow from the
central bank at the rate ρCB despite having chosen a suboptimal eﬀort level e′.
The beneﬁt from the deviation is then Φ(e∗)−Φ(e′). A deviation is costly if the
creditor’s loan is not settled early and the creditor is not chosen to be a dealer,
which happens with probability 1 − S(1 − λ). In that case, the creditor must
ﬁnd a dealer who will rediscount the note at the central bank. Since dealers
can perfectly observe the quality of the loan, the deviating creditor obtains
less consumption. Let E[V (l′,e′)] denote the creditor’s expected value function
when eﬀort e′ is chosen.
We can write the payoﬀ from deviating as
Φ(e
∗) − Φ(e
′) − [1 − S(1 − λ)]{E[V (l
∗,e
∗)] − E[V (l
′,e
′)]}.
Taking the derivative of this expression with respect to e′ and setting it equal
to zero yields Φ′(e′) = [1 − S(1 − λ)]E[V2(l′,e′)].
This expression is similar to equation (14) with the added term [1 − S(1 − λ)].
The creditor who considers deviating will not do so if S = 0. Hence, if S → 0,
then there is an equilibrium such that all creditors exert the eﬃcient level of
eﬀort while otherwise this equilibrium does not exist.8
Restricting the fraction of agents who can trade with the central bank also
limits the incentives to deviate in the case of the market insensitive policy.
However, as we have already shown, the central bank is unable to consistently
choose the right cost for liquidity in that case. Below, we argue that in special
8Note that if the eﬀort took value on a discreet set with no converging subsequence, then
we could ﬁnd S > 0 such that agents choose the eﬃcient level of eﬀort whenever S < S.
19situations where the discount window plays an important role, it is important
that it be widely accessible.
The fact that there are creditors on both sides of the discount market is the
key feature that allows the central bank to inject liquidity into the payment
system while also providing the proper incentives for creditors. Suppose for
example that instead of the market sensitive above the central bank provides
liquidity by ﬁrst observing a small sample (which we will denote as S) of market
transactions and then setting a discount rate ρo, based on this sample, to
transact with the rest of the market. A creditor knows, in this case, that
if they are in the set S then they cannot misrepresent their eﬀort, if they
transact in the set 1−S then they can misrepresent their loans by selling them
to the central bank at ρo. Since presumably only observing a small subset is
feasible, the risk to the creditors of misrepresenting their eﬀort is small and
correspondingly the eﬀort used in monitoring loans will be small.
5.3.4 Discussion
As in Freeman (1999), the policy resembling open market operations in our
model diﬀer from typical central bank practice. Central banks usually repur-
chase treasury securities in open market operations rather than loans. Neither
model is rich enough to capture all the institutional details but they can nev-
ertheless provide interesting insights. As in Freeman (1999), we ﬁnd that a
market sensitive policy, resembling in some ways an open market operation,
should be preferred by the central bank. The reasons are diﬀerent, however,
and our model also provides new conclusions such as the need to restrict access
to the central bank in the case of market sensitive policies.
The market insensitive policy captures the principle features of the discount
window in the US system or the upper and lower bands of the channel in the
Canadian system. These prices are set periodically and are reviewed at a much
20lower frequency then the frequency of market interactions; without much loss
of generality we consider them ﬁxed at the beginning of time.
Similarly, the market sensitive policy captures some important features of
open market operations, which are an important tool in the implementation of
monetary policy in most industrialized countries. The central bank interacts
with one set of banks when it conducts policy and these banks in turn interact
with other banks in the interbank market. In the U.S. and Canada these banks
are called primary dealers.
While in our model dealers are chosen randomly, the primary dealers that
can bid for funds from the Federal Reserve and the members of the LVTS
in Canada do not change frequently. In our model, agents cannot establish
reputations with the central bank. For that reason, randomness is useful to
mitigate moral hazard. In practice, primary dealers are well known institutions
and the Federal Reserve or the Bank of Canada have other ways to mitigate
moral hazard problems with these institutions. Nevertheless, the importance
of restricting direct access to the central bank is due to similar frictions in
each case. As an alternative, we could have assumed that the central bank
can enforce loans it makes to a subset of banks, but that it cannot enforce the
loans it makes to other banks. The former kind of bank could be chosen to be
dealers. Under that assumption, dealers would not be chosen randomly.
6 A Role for the Discount Window
The preceding analysis implies that an open-market operation will dominate
discount lending by relaxing a liquidity shock but not letting default risk be
transferred from the creditors to the central bank. This then leads one to
wonder under what conditions a discount window would be an optimal policy?
In this section we argue that a discount window can be useful if the central
21bank makes mistakes in evaluating the amount of liquidity it needs to inject.
Also, in rare situations the interbank market may not function properly. The
event following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, provide an example.
6.1 Random Liquidity Needs
The amount of liquidity needed in the interbank market can ﬂuctuate for rea-
sons that are out of the control of the central banks. These “autonomous
factors,” such as the funding needs of the Treasury, must be estimated and
accommodated when the central bank does open market operations.9 If the
central bank makes a mistake and provides too little liquidity, the interest rate
will increase, as in our model.
If a discount window is available, the interest rate will be capped by the
discount window rate. Indeed, if the market rate were to exceed the discount
window rate, banks should prefer to borrow from the discount window. If
mistakes by the central bank are rare, the availability of the discount window
will not aﬀect incentives to monitor very much.
If a role for the discount window is to protect banks against these kind of
random shocks, it is desirable that it be widely accessible. Otherwise, one could
be concerned that the restricted set of banks who have access to the discount
window would exploit their position.
One way to approximate such shocks in our model would be to assume that
α is random. If α turns out to be smaller than the central bank expected,
the interest rate will rise because the liquidity constraint (12) will bind. The
discount window rate should be set high enough that creditors will not choose
to access the discount window when there is a default shock but only when α
is small.
9In the Canadian case these ﬁscal agency operations are done by the Bank of Canada,
but the need for forecasting is essentially the same.
226.2 Market Collapse
The description by Lacker (2004) of the events on September 11th 2001 gives
another example of when discount window lending plays an important role.
In this case a large scale shock caused a temporary disruption in the inter-
bank market which made trade diﬃcult or impossible. Open-market operations
where impossible due to a the lack of a functioning market. In this case the
blunt instrument of discount window lending allowed the Federal Reserve to
relax the eﬀects this shock had on market participants.
In the context of our model we could think of a September 11th situation as
one where αt is an iid random variable with two outcomes. In one state it takes
some ﬁnite value α and in the second state, which we term a market collapse,
it takes the value of one. We further assume that the second state has some
arbitrarily small probability of occurring and is transitory in nature.
If the market collapses, there are no late-leaving creditors, and there is no
discount market since no one wants to buy the unsettled loans. The lack of
a market then rules out the use of a market sensitive policy which requires a
functioning discount market. In contrast, the discount window operates outside
of the market and can be used to help relax the liquidity constraint.
Assume that the ex ante probability distribution for the liquidity parame-
ter αt+1 is a random variable where with probability ǫ the market breakdown
happens (αt+1 equals one) otherwise with probability 1−ǫ the parameter αt+1
is some α. Taking ǫ to be arbitrarily small it follows that the ﬁrst order condi-
tions of the creditors will, in the limit, approach those of the model above. In
this economy, setting a market insensitive rate less than the discount rate asso-
ciated to the no monitoring case will make the policy inactive as described in
section 5.3.2. In the case of an ex post market breakdown (αt+1 equals one) the
discount window becomes the active tool of intervention and in this equilibrium
the discount rate becomes ρno deﬁned by the non-market collapse parameter
23α. This policy then partially relaxes the liquidity constraint, and partially
improves the risk-sharing for the creditors exposed to the market breakdown.10
In a market breakdown situation the results are quantitatively similar to the
description of events by Lacker (2004) as well as the discussion by Williamson
(2004). In a 9/11 situation discount lending will drastically increase to help
the settlement of funds. One key diﬀerence between our model and that of
Williamson (2004) is that the central bank in our model must ensure that an
excessively loose discount window policy will not have incentive eﬀects in a
normally functioning economy which restricts the amount of liquidity provision
in a market breakdown.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we extend the model of Freeman (1999) to include moral hazard.
This is important because moral hazard is a major aspect of policy discussions
concerning the provision of liquidity by central banks. When moral hazard is a
concern, it is no longer optimal for the central bank to absorb losses associated
with default, as suggested by Freeman.
We show how a policy resembling open market operations allows the central
bank to provide liquidity without reducing creditors incentives to monitor. Re-
stricting the fraction of creditors who have access to the central bank increases
the probability that agents will have to obtain funds from other creditors. Since
creditors are better informed about the quality of loans than is the central bank,
this provides more incentive for creditors to make sure they hold loans of high
quality. By letting creditors compete for funds, the central bank can extract
information about the state of the economy to which creditors have access.
10These results depend on the fact that the market breakdown is transitory in nature;
which implies that stationary equilibrium and central bank policy have not changed for
future discount markets.
24In addition this type of policy provides proper incentives to creditors to mon-
itor their loans eﬃciently and hence reduce the aggregate default size when
compared to a policy consisting only of a discount window policy.
We also argue that in particular situations it may be desirable for banks to
have direct access to the central bank so that liquidity can be obtained without
relying on the market. For example, after September 11, 2001, the interbank
market could not operate because of physical destruction to telecommunication
infrastructures. It was therefore important for banks to have direct access to
the central bank.
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